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incidental monopoly was not within the statute. The American Sugar
Refining case' 9 held that the particular contract there involved was
intrastate and hence the federal courts had no jurisdiction. In the
Northern Securities case,20 the concurring opinion of Justice Brewer
referred to the common law rule of reason.21 This "rule of reason"
was proclaimed by the majority of the Court in the Standard Oil
case 22 and the American Tobacco case. 23  The U. S. Steel Corp.
case 24 declared that a monopoly must be successful or a series of
acts must be prejudicial to society before a combination would be
declared illegal. Thus the plain meaning of the Act was hedged
about and construed away until it merely affected the form of com-
bination, but was powerless to hinder monopolies which produced at
minimum social cost. The recognition of this fact led to the Federal
Trade Commission Act 2 5 and, under the sponsorship of the Commis-
sion, over a hundred trade practice conferences have been held in the
past fifteen years. In spite of the rulings of the Federal Trade
Commission which have been upheld by the Court,26 the mushroom
growth of the holding companies, culminating in the unstable pyra-
mid of the 1929 boom and resulting in the recent collapse, brought
home to the administration that monopoly is necessary and may be
beneficial in the form of trade associations and labor unions under the
rigid control of the government. Thus we see that the suspension of
the anti-trust laws by the National Recovery Act is not a bolt from
the blue in so far as it indicates a change in policy, but is the final
recognition by the present administration of the tinderlying economic
trend of the last half century.
RHEA JOSEPHSON.
EMERGENCY MORTGAGE LEGISLATION.-Out of the land has
come the enormous wealth of this country and in the land has been
invested the greater part of the wealth which the land has produced.
"United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
20 193 U. S. 197 (1903).
'Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 61 L. J. Q. B. 295 (1892) A. C. 25.
' Supra note 15.
Id. at 106.
"United States v. United States Steel Co., 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293
(1919).
138 STAT. 717 (1914) 15 U. S. C. A. 41, 45, 46 (1928), declaring that
"unfair methods of competition in commerce are declared unlawful," that the
Federal Trade Commission is established, inter alia, for investigation of com-
pliance with anti-trust decrees; for investigation of violation of anti-trust
statutes; and for readjustment of business corporations violating anti-trust
satutes.
Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 Sup. Ct. 572
(1920) ; Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441,
42 Sup. Ct. 150 (1922); Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refrigerator
Co., 261 U. S. 463, 43 Sup. Ct. 450 (1923).
CURRENT LEGISLATION
There is no one who is not affected by mortgages on real property
and a mortgage on good land has always been regarded as among the
safest of investments.
Because of this fact, we find that Savings banks 1 in New York
can invest up to sixty-five per cent of their funds in first mortgages
on improved property and the portfolios of life insurance companies 2
hold a large proportion of them. Trust companies bought them in
their fiduciary capacity 3 and prudent individuals chose them as a sure
way of building up a secondary income. Lawyers recommended them
to their clients for investments.
New York City was the prime field and its offerings found a
ready market among mortgage investors. From this fact there was
developed the conservative guaranteed mortgage which was issued by
title or mortgage companies and sold by them to their clients with
the companies' guaranty of payment of interest and principal at ma-
turity and any charges which might be against the property because
of the mortgagor's default.
4
Mortgages in large amounts were sold to the banks, insurance
companies, and the sizeable trusts. To provide an investment for
the person of small means, the mortgage certificate was developed.
This was a share or participation in a large mortgage or a group of
small loans and was sold in units of $50.00 and $100.00.
The issuing company, as mortgagee, received all payments under
the indenture both in the case of whole loans or certificates, and de-
ducted one-half of one per cent from the interest rate in considera-
tion of its guarantee. These companies were under the jurisdiction
of the insurance department of the state, but they were not governed
by the strict rules which have always been applied to the life insur-
ance companies. There was no actuarial control, but this form of in-
vestment, nevertheless, had an exceptional record of safety for many
years.
In the period from 1921 until 1929, realty experienced an un-
precedented boom in the metropolitan area. Developments varying
from small houses to the gigantic business buildings in Manhattan
were erected and the mortgage market easily and greedily absorbed
all offerings. The demand for securities and the facility with which
they were sold undoubtedly caused competitive bidding between the
companies which is proving disastrous in some instances. The guar-
anteed loans referred to here, however, are not to be confused with
the speculative mortgage bond flotations which were also flourishing
in this decade. Values mounted altitudinously and the amounts
loaned on bond and mortgage rose proportionately. Rents were
IN. Y. BANKING LAWS (1914) §239.
2N. Y. INS. LAW (1909) §100.
IN. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW (1909) §111.
'Supra note 2, §§170-183.
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high, but they were being collected by the landlord and the mort-
gagee was having scant trouble with defaults.
With the Wall Street crash of 1929, the high interest rate for
call money dropped and starting in March, 1930, funds which had
been diverted to the call money market came back to the mortgage
field. There was a greater demand than supply and at a time when
most securities had no sale at all.
The basis of value of real estate is, obviously, its income, and
income is determined by supply and demand. The debacle of 1929
did not begin to be felt acutely in real estate until 1931. Reductions
in income which persons received, and in an ever increasing number
of cases, entire cessation of income, because of economic conditions,
caused an upheaval which has now only started to settle back. Ten-
ants had to remove to lower priced quarters; store-keepers had to
have lower rents or close their shops; two and even three families
began living together to conserve their slender resources. To offset
this, landlords had to reduce their rentals to retain or attract tenants
so that they might get some revenue from their holdings.
Meantime, fixed charges, such as interest and taxes were un-
changed and the income was seriously impaired. Loans made in the
boom years of 1926-1928 began to mature and it was found that
there was an enormous shrinkage in value, due to decreased income.
Guaranteed mortgages, sold by title and mortgage companies,
had an "eighteen months" clause in them which provided that, on
maturity, the company could defer payment of the principal for that
period of time. For the first time in their history, these companies
invoked this clause in the fall of 1931.
Most investors in this type of security were usually content to
let their funds remain with the companies, but financial distress
caused tremendous numbers of them to ask the companies to re-
deem them at this time. Doing so, the liquidity of the companies
was impaired and, also, paying interest and taxes on defaulted prop-
erties had rapidly eaten up the funds which their companies had
been obliged to borrow from the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion in 1932.
Savings banks and insurance companies with their millions in
mortgages, both guaranteed and placed by them direct with borrow-
ers, were caught in the deluge of foreclosure and in this time of
chaos, President Roosevelt declared the Banking Holiday. Distress
was everywhere; no section was immune. Properties could not be
sold for amount of the first mortgages. All types of investors were
involved, hardship faced many of them, and the income of our largest
institutions was impaired, upon which, in turn, depositors and policy
holders were depending absolutely.
To meet such a crisis temporarily, the following statutes were
enacted by the Legislature of the State of New York during the
regular and extraordinary sessions in 1933:
CURRENT LEGISLATION
I. Mortgage Modification and Extension Act.5
II. Re-organization of Title and Mortgage Guaranty Com-
panies.0
III. Certificate Holders Protective Corporation.
7
This legislation was enacted entirely because of a serious public
emergency. It contravenes the constitutions both of the United
States s and the state of New York,9 unless it is justified by public
policy. To date of this writing, the Court of Appeals has not re-
-ported a decision on any of the various cases now in litigation.
I. Mortgage Modification and Extension Act.
Considering these three provisions as listed supra, the first en-
actment was effective April 21, 1933,10 and it provides that "corpo-
rations, trustees, executors, administrators, guardians and other per-
sons holding trust funds, savings banks and other corporations"
which have investments on bond and mortgage now matured or ma-
turing before April 1, 1935, which were within the legal ratio when
made, but which may now be less than that ratio because of depre-
ciated values, these institutions and individuals may extend these
mortgages for a period of not more than five years from date of ex-
tension, and either with or without consideration, they may waive
or modify any conditions or terms thereof, whether the mortgage
be guaranteed or not.
In the present market it would be impossible in most cases to
replace these loans with another mortgagee. To foreclose them would
be a hardship not only on the mortgagor, but also on the mortgagee.
Such an act would only lead to greater difficulty and perhaps result
in a deficiency judgment against a mortgagor who had always been
punctilious in observing his obligations under the indenture.
The banks, likewise, are enabled to do an act which would other-
wise be illegal. Savings banks may lend up to sixty per cent of the
appraised value of real property,1 while trust money 12 and insurance
funds 13 may be loaned up to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent.
'N. Y. LAws (1933) c. 319.
' Id. at c. 745.
'Id. at c. 453.
'U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, §10 and Amend. XIV.
'N. Y. CoNsT., art. I, §6.
"Supra note 5.
"Supra note 1.
12 Supra note 3.
"
3Supra note 2.
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The standing of guaranteed mortgages as conservative and safe
investments can be shown by no better illustration than that the
Legislature expressly authorized trustees to purchase them with the
funds in their care.14
II. Re-Organization of Title and Mortgage Guaranty Companies.
This statute was enacted to be effective May 3, 1933,'" and pro-
vides for the protection of holders of guaranteed mortgages and
certificates of participation. The legislature acted because of public
emergency so that the funds of these companies might be safeguarded
for the good of the greatest number of the people of the state and
to provide an orderly manner of liquidation, if needed.
Under this statute, the superintendent of insurance is vested
with powers and "may take over, administer, exercise, conduct, exe-
cute and manage or he may restrict, limit, govern, control, direct,
and regulate any or all of the functions of any guaranty corporations
with respect to any mortgage investment sold or guaranteed by such
corporation," whenever such action is deemed advisable by him in
the interests of the security-holders, when, first, he has taken the
company over for rehabilitation, or secondly, the security is in de-
fault.
The superintendent himself, or by agent, may perform any act
which the company can do and may regulate the company's actions.
Under this power he has continued the control which he exercised
over the companies on March 15, 1933, during the Banking Holiday. 6
As a result of his rulings, these companies are not permitted to
disburse any moneys under any mortgage agreement, unless they
have received these moneys from the mortgagor. That this is alter-
ing a contract in violation of the Constitution of the United States
and also depriving the holder of property without due process would
be beyond argument,17 save for the crisis in public welfare. It is
fully as justified in this economic strife as any war measure would
be in time of invasion by a foreign enemy.
In this way only can the payment of principal be made more cer-
tain ultimately. To disburse the funds now available to those whose
loans are maturing first would be grossly unjust to the other holders
of similar securities whose holdings may not mature for two or three
years. Such priority could not be justified on any equitable basis.
Under this authority, fourteen companies are now being oper-
ated in this manner and an orderly process of equitable administra-
tion and liquidation is in progress. No obligation to a security holder
O'ToOLE, LAW OF TRUSTS (1933) 89.
15 Supra note 6.
"N. Y. LAWS (1933) c. 40.
Supra notes 9 and 10.
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is impaired or waived by such operation under the Act. Various
economies have been effected through consolidations and by elimi-
nating expensive duplications. In the report to Governor Lehman by
the Superintendent of Insurance, there is much to be found which
confirms the hope of the ultimate benefit to all.' 8
III. Certificate Protection Corporation.
This statute 1o permits five or more persons to incorporate so as
to operate the properties represented by the mortgage participation
certificates which it holds for their owners. The corporation's life
is limited to five years, but it may be renewed for a five-year period.
Five directors, and not more than ten, all of whom must be citizens
of the state of New York, endorsed by both the Governor and the
Superintendent of Insurance conduct the corporation affairs for the
benefit of those who deposit securities with it.
Expense of operation is shared on a pro rata basis of the secur-
ity holdings of the members. The corporation .stands in place of
the mortgagee and has all his powers over the property which it
may operate or manage and if it forecloses, it becomes a fee owner
on sale. The corporation is governed by the New York General
Corporation Law and the Stock Corporation Law, except when they
conflict with this statute. Its capital is limited to $1,000 and shares
have par value of $5.00.
These three enactments are most drastic in establishing public
policy as supreme in a time of emergency, flaunting as they do the
time-honored rules relative to contract rights 20 and the due process
clause.21
The peril is so great and the distress so acute and general that
it is difficult to see how the legislature's action could have been other-
wise. It is unfortunately true that many mortgagors, like lessees,
will believe that a valid instrument is only another scrap of paper
which does not bind them at all. This class of persons has always ex-
isted and has usually felt that identical way about most of their obli-
gations. Morally they are immune to everything and the legislature
cannot change them. It is hard to think, however, that because of
these emergency enactments individuals and corporations who have
always heretofore met their obligations willingly and are now pre-
vented from doing so only by extreme economic conditions, will not
again perform their part of their contracts, when their financial posi-
tions are restored to them.
The home is the foundation of our national existence and its
safety is the country's safety. The most desirable loan for a mort-
l'N. Y. L. J., Nov. 13, 1933, at 1739.
a' Supra note 7.
o Supra note 9.
' Supra note 10.
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gage investor whether he had a few thousand dollars of his own or
was purchasing for an institution which had a billion, has always
been the small home. Hence, more obligations affecting a maximum
number of both borrowers and lenders are involved in our present
crisis.
We have a triangle of three great institutions of our national
life: our homes, our savings banks, and our life insurance com-
panies. Select the one which we are going to let fall and then try
to find a replacement for it. No small part of our present difficulty
has been caused by improper financing and thousands of homes were
purchased by families who should have deferred such action until
they had more money to invest at the start. The speculative builder
of large structures did the same thing. While they are seeking to
remedy our emergency, and in so doing, are riding roughshod over
the contract and due process clauses, perhaps the legislature might
continue their action and avoid future repetitions, in part, by making
drastic changes in the limits on mortgages and the minimum amount
of cash which prospective purchasers or builders would have to put
into an operation. Our forward progress might be at a much lower
rate of speed, but the average attained might be higher. It would
seem that the preventive powers of public policy should be as great
as it is remedial.
In his message to Congress on April 13, 1933, concerning the
Home Owners Loan Corporation, President .Roosevelt said:
"The broad interests of the nation require that special
safeguards should be thrown around home owners as a guar-
antee of social and economic stability and that to protect home
owners from inequitable enforced liquidation, in time of gen-
eral distress, is a proper concern of the government."
J. H.C.
